Wayzata World Factbook 1996/The World Factbook - 1996 Edition - Wayzata Technology (3079) (1996).iso/pc/text/humanrts/pakistan.txt

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TITLE:  PAKISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995

                            PAKISTAN


Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which power is shared
between the Prime Minister, as the leader of the National
Assembly, and the President.  The Chief of Army Staff also
wields considerable influence on many major policy decisions
and is the third member of the unofficial "troika" which
governs the nation.  During 1994, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
dominated political policymaking, with President Farooq Leghari
playing a complementary role.  Chief of Army Staff General
Abdul Waheed consulted closely with the Government but avoided
active involvement in governing.

Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the
police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and
Frontier Constabulary, are responsible for maintaining law and
order in frontier areas.  On November 30, the Army and
paramilitary forces ended their operation, begun in 1992, to
help restore law and order in Sindh province.  Provincial
governments control the police and paramilitary forces when
they are assisting in law and order operations.  Both forces
committed abuses in 1994.

Pakistan is a poor country, with great extremes in the
distribution of wealth, an extremely high rate of illiteracy,
and a per capita income of $400.  Its economy includes both
state-run and private industries and financial institutions.
The Constitution assures the right to private property and the
right of private businesses to operate freely in most sectors
of the economy.  The Government continues to pursue economic
reform, emphasizing the privatization of government-owned
financial institutions, industrial units, and utilities.
Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are
the principal exports.

Although the Government made strong public commitments to
address human rights concerns, particularly those involving
women, child labor, and minority religions, most human rights
abuses are rooted deeply in the social fabric.  At year's end,
these efforts had not resulted in a significant change in the
overall human rights situation.  Serious problems continue in
many areas.  Government forces continued to use arbitrary
arrest and detention, and have tortured or otherwise abused
prisoners and detainees.  They are unchecked by any serious
government effort to reform the police or judicial systems or
to prosecute those responsible for abuse.  This Government, as
did previous ones, continued to harass political opponents and
to repress the Sindh-based Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)
political party.

Islamic religious zealots continued to discriminate against and
persecute religious minorities, basing their activities in part
on discriminatory legislation against those religious
minorities.  The Government proposed changes in the enforcement
of the so-called blasphemy law to limit its abuse, but no
changes were enacted and abuse continued.  However, in November
the Lahore High Court overturned the 1992 blasphemy conviction
of a Christian, Gul Masih.

Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous
murders, mosque bombings, and occasional civil disturbances.
Traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a
subordinate position in society.  They continued to be
subjected to murder, torture, rape, and other forms of
degradation both by agents of the State and societal elements.
The Government and employers continued to restrict workers'
rights significantly.  The use of child and bonded labor
remained widespread in spite of both legislation to restrict
these practices and the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on child labor with the International Labor
Organization (ILO).  Little was done to improve basic
conditions for women and children.  Female children continued
to fall behind their male counterparts in such measures as
levels of health care and education.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Extrajudicial killings, often in the form of staged "police
encounters" in which the police or military shoot and kill the
suspects--many of them unarmed--continued in 1994.  Most of
these killings occurred in rural Sindh Province as part of the
Army's law and order program, "Operation Cleanup," which ended
on November 30.  A survey conducted in June by the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that the incidence of
excesses committed by or attributed to the Army and the police
in Sindh had diminished in early 1994.  However, the frequency
of extrajudicial killing throughout Pakistan reported in the
press indicates that this continues to be a serious problem.

A typical case occurred on May 3, when police killed five men
in Sukkur, Sindh province.  An HRCP investigation determined
that the men were rounded up, brought to a police clerk's
residence, tied up and killed with automatic weapons in a
well-planned operation.  The Government denied this allegation,
saying the victims were dangerous criminals who were killed
during a 2-hour "encounter" with police.

The HRCP reported 32 extrajudicial deaths in Sindh between
January and May.  Many are believed to have died as a result of
police torture.  The Government did not charge or try any law
enforcement personnel for these killings.

The Government used excessive force to control political
demonstrations in Karachi.  At least 13 people were killed and
87 injured during police clashes with MQM demonstrators from
April 29 to May 1.  The opposition claims that the police
killed two demonstrators in October during an
opposition-organized strike in Punjab.

Ethnic and sectarian tensions rose during 1994.  Members of
Shi'a and Sunni Muslim organizations targeting rival groups set
off numerous bombs, especially in Sindh and Punjab provinces,
causing over a dozen deaths.  The Government made few arrests.
Some of the bombs were set off following inflammatory sermons
delivered during Friday prayers.  Ethnic and religiously
motivated riots continued to occur.  In Karachi, people were
killed almost daily in fighting among factions of the MQM, and
between the MQM and Sindhi nationalists.  The rate of killings
increased in the second half of the year.

     b.  Disappearance

There were no reported disappearances.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

There continued to be credible evidence that police tortured
and otherwise mistreated detainees.  For example, the HRCP
reported that Bakhshan Khan Bhatti died in jail on July 25.
Prisoners claim that Bhatti was hung upside down and beaten.
However, the authorities maintained that he died from illness
and internal pain.

In other cases, 13 police officers were charged with torturing
to death Pervez Akhtar in a police lockup on June 17 in Gujar
Khan, Punjab.  The Government arrested four officers in
connection with Akhtar's death, but released them on bail and
took no further action.  According to a May 25 press report, a
Christian boy was tortured to death while in Gojra Sadar police
custody.  In one egregious case, security forces arrested a
25-year-old MQM activist in Sindh province on June 21,
reportedly blindfolded and stripped him, and questioned him
about the location of MQM weapons.  The activist died in
custody.  After family members recovered the man's body, they
reported that his eyes had been gouged out, his neck drilled,
his ears chopped off, and his shoulder and backbone broken.

Police and jailers so routinely use force to elicit confessions
and compel detainees to incriminate others that the practice
has become standard procedure.  Torture methods included:
beating, burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of the
feet, sexual assault, prolonged isolation, electric shock,
denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, forced spreading
of the legs, and public humiliation including stripping in
public.  Some magistrates and doctors helped cover up the abuse
by issuing investigation and medical reports that the victims
died of natural causes.

Police frequently use the threat of abuse to extort money from
prisoners and their families.  In some cases, the authorities
have detained whole families to force a relative, the subject
of an arrest warrant, to surrender.

Upon assuming his position, the superintendent of the Karachi
central jail reportedly ordered 450 prisoners stripped, and
many of them beaten, injuring at least 50.  During this period
from January 13 to 15, the prisoners were kept in a 24-hour
lockup, with no toilet facilities, no water, and little food.
The superintendent justified his actions as part of his mandate
to clean up corruption at the jail.  Abuse is reported to have
continued in the jail throughout the year.

Despite regulations that prohibit the police from detaining
women overnight, some women continue to be arbitrarily detained
overnight and sexually abused.  The police reportedly gang
raped five women in a village in Sindh province on January 18.
Although there is increasing coverage of rape in the
English-language press, rape victims often do not file reports
because of social taboos, police intimidation, and family
pressure.  There are few policewomen to perform matron duties,
despite regulations requiring that policewomen must be present
in station houses during the questioning or detention of
females.  To address this problem, the Government opened
"women's police stations" in several cities staffed by female
personnel.  However, the press has reported that the staff is
poorly trained.  The Government is offering these officers
additional training.

Rape, along with other forms of police and military abuse,
takes place in a climate of impunity caused by the failure of
successive Governments to prosecute and punish the abusers.
This failure is the single largest obstacle to ending or even
reducing the incidence of abuse.  The authorities transfer or
arrest offending officers, but seldom prosecute or punish
them.  There were no known court convictions of abusive police
officers in 1994.  In general, investigating officers shield
their colleagues.  Persons who attempt to bring charges against
police officers are often threatened by other officers and drop
the charges.  However, according to one human rights advocate,
the Government took action in several cases--a move which
reportedly resulted in a decline of such sexual abuse cases in
1994.

The incidence of torture and abuse was not restricted to the
security forces.  There were reports that different factions of
the MQM tortured and killed members of rival groups.  Three
persons were killed on July 16 in Karachi.  According to the
press, two of the victims were members of the MQM's Altaf
group.  Their bodies were discovered in a field with marks of
torture, including burn wounds and broken bones.  The other
victim, a member of the MQM's Haqiqi group, was gunned down in
the street along with his 5-year-old niece.  MQM gunmen are
also suspected of murdering six Karachi policemen on June 28.

The Hadood Ordinances, promulgated by the central Government in
1979, were an attempt to make the Penal Code more Islamic.
These Ordinances provide harsh punishments for violating
Islamic law, or Shari'a, including death by stoning for
unlawful sexual relations and amputation for some other
crimes.  In practice, the standards of evidence for imposing
these punishments are exceptionally high, and to date they have
never been carried out.

Nonetheless, these laws apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike
and weigh most heavily on women.  Under these ordinances, a
woman who reports that she has been raped or files for divorce
may find herself charged with adultery.  All consensual
extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of the
Hadood Ordinances.  However, according to a lawyer from the
HRCP, the Government has brought fewer charges against women
under the Hadood Ordinances than in the past, and the courts
have shown greater leniency toward women in their sentences and
in the granting of bail.

There are three classes of prison facilities:  Class "C" cells
generally hold common criminals--convicts and those in pretrial
detention.  Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings,
and poor food.  The use of handcuffs and fetters is common.
Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse, such
as beatings and being forced to kneel for long periods.
Conditions in "B" and "A" cells are markedly better.  The
authorities reserve the latter for "prominent" persons.

There were several reports in 1994 that wealthy landlords or
political parties operated private jails.  Many such jails are
believed to exist in tribal and feudal areas.  Some of the
prisoners have reportedly been held in them for many years.
The police raided several such jails in 1994 and released the
prisoners.  In February the police raided a private jail
operated by a local landlord in Umerkot, Sindh province.  They
released 13 men, 11 women, 9 girls, and 7 boys.  The police
arrested four persons during the raid.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The law permits a Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district
to order detention without charge for 30 days of persons
suspected of threatening public order and safety.  The DC may
renew detention in 30-day periods, for a total of 90 days.  For
other criminal offenses, the police may hold a suspect for 24
hours without charge.  If the police can provide material proof
that detention is necessary for an investigation, a court may
extend detention for a total of 15 days.

In practice, the authorities do not strictly observe the limits
on detention.  The police are not required to notify anyone
when an arrest is made, and often hold detainees without charge
until they are challenged by a court.  The police sometimes
detain individuals arbitrarily without charge, or on false
charges, in order to extort payment for their release.  The law
stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30
days of their arrest.  However, in many cases trials do not
start until about 6 months after the filing of charges.

The authorities generally permit family members and lawyers to
visit inmates.  However, in some cases the authorities refuse
such visits, even though the detainee has been held for years
awaiting trial.  A report published by the HRCP on a visit to a
prison in Sukkur, Sindh province, in July cited 11 detainees
who had been awaiting trial from 1 to 3 years.  HRCP officials
speculate that detainees in other areas may have been held for
over 10 years.

The Government uses mass arrests to quell civil unrest.  The
army arrested over 800 MQM party workers from May 4 to 7,
following 5 days of violence in Karachi.  The arrested included
3 MQM Senators and 11 MQM members of the Sindh Provincial
Assembly.  Almost all were released within 1 week.  The
authorities established detention facilities near the
Provincial Assembly building to allow jailed assembly members
to attend sessions.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas have a separate legal
system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which recognizes the
doctrine of "collective responsibility."  Under this
regulation, the authorities are empowered to detain the fellow
members of a fugitive's tribe, or to blockade the fugitive's
village, pending his surrender or punishment by his own tribe,
as is the local tradition.  The Government exercised such
authority in 1994.  After the Supreme Court ruled that all
federal laws extend to tribal areas, the tribes in the Malakand
Division of the Northwest Frontier province clashed with
government forces, demanding a return to Islamic law.  The
tribes blockaded roads and an airport, killed a member of the
Provincial Assembly, and held numerous officials hostage.  In
response, government forces were called in to pacify the area,
and burned several houses belonging to the leaders of the
unrest.  In November the provincial government agreed to a
return to Shari'a law in Malakand Division after 30 Islamic
activists and soldiers were killed in the fighting.

In August the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), the
Government's military intelligence organization, detained
Shaukat Ali Kashmiri, the Secretary General of the Jammu and
Kashmir People's National Party.  In September the ISI released
Mr. Kashmiri from Attock Fort Detention Center, but denied that
it had held him in detention.

The authorities arrested more than 1,100 political opponents of
Prime Minister Bhutto, including 45 members of the provincial
and national assemblies, prior to or during the October 11
general strike.  The authorities charged only a few of them and
released most within a month.  The Government filed criminal
charges, ranging from murder to possession of illegal weapons,
against five opposition members of the National Assembly who
were arrested on October 11.  Three were later released on bail
but two refused to apply for bail and remained in custody at
year's end.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The judicial system involves several different court systems
with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions.  There
are civil and criminal systems with special courts for
high-profile cases, as well as the Federal Shari'a appeals
courts for certain Hadood offenses.  The appeals process in the
civil system is:  civil court, district court, high court, and
Supreme Court.  In the criminal system, the progression is:
magistrate, sessions court, high court, and Supreme Court.

The civil judicial system provides for an open trial,
cross-examination, representation by an attorney, and appeal of
sentences.  Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in
capital cases.  There are no jury trials.  Owing to the limited
number of judges, the heavy backlog of cases, and outdated
court procedures, cases routinely drag on for years.  In both
the Hadood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and
nonbailable offenses.  According to the Criminal Procedures
Code, the accused in bailable offenses must be granted bail and
the accused in "nonbailable" offenses should be granted bail if
accused of a crime where the sentence is less than 10 years.
Bail is set, often purposely, at unreasonably high levels for
indigent defendants.

The Federal Shari'a Court,and the Shari'a Bench of the Supreme
Court serve as appeals courts for certain convictions in the
criminal court under the Hadood Ordinances.  The Federal
Shari'a Court also may overturn legislation judged to be
inconsistent with the tenets of Islam.  However, these cases
may be appealed to the Shari'a Bench of the Supreme Court.

The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic
infighting and inactivity and the overlapping jurisdictions of
the different court systems.  Scores of positions in the lower
magistracy remained unfilled.  Persons in jail awaiting trial
are sometimes held for periods longer than the sentence they
would receive if convicted.

Cases involving bombings, sabotage, highway robberies,
banditry, or kidnaping may be brought before three types of
special courts.  These include the special courts established
by the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act of 1975 to try
"terrorist" cases and the "speedy trial courts," established by
a 1987 ordinance to circumvent the judicial backlog.  The
Government abolished both of these courts in July.  A third
type of court, established in 1991 by the Constitution's 12th
amendment, adjudicates heinous crimes.  In 1991 the President
promulgated new ordinances which gave the Federal Government
the exclusive authority to refer cases to these courts.  In
practice, the Government refers cases involving violent
criminal offenses to these courts.

Many legal experts believe the special courts do not provide
for a fair trial.  They maintain that the short time for
investigations and trials detract from the accused's right to
prepare an adequate defense.  Some observers maintain that
trial procedures have effectively repudiated the presumption of
innocence.  They also cite the encroachment by federal
authorities on the provincial government's constitutional
authority to administer justice and the inherent unfairness of
parallel courts to which cases may be assigned arbitrarily.
Moreover, the special courts may deny bail if the judges decide
that the accused may have reasonably committed an offense.

Government officials and some attorneys maintain that despite
the deficiencies, the special courts are necessary because of
the judicial backlog.  They also maintain that the rules of
evidence apply in the courts, defendants have the right to
counsel, and the judges must meet the same standards as those
appointed to a high court.  Defendants also have the right to
appeal, but only one appeal is allowed.

In late 1993, the Government announced that it would allow the
speedy trial courts ordinance to lapse in July 1994.  After
that date, the Government transferred all pending cases and
investigations before the speedy courts to the regular courts.
The special terrorist courts still exist.

The judiciary is not independent.  Through the President's
power to transfer High Court justices and grant tenure to new
appointees, the executive branch is able to influence the
provincial High Courts, and especially the lower levels of the
judicial system.  Judges in the special courts are retired
jurists, who are hired on renewable contracts.  The desire to
maintain their positions influences many of their decisions.

Despite the Government's promise to strengthen judicial
independence, it took several measures regarded as efforts to
influence the court for political reasons.  In February, in a
ruling regarded as politically motivated, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of two members of the Northwest Frontier
Provincial Assembly, who were members of the Muslim League
Nawaz group, to join the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).  Their
move allowed the PPP to gain control of the assembly.  In other
moves regarded as politically motivated, the PPP government and
the President transferred the well-respected chief justice of
the Sindh High Court to the Federal Shari'a court, replacing
him with a judge considered loyal to the PPP.  There was also
criticism of the appointment of 20 new judges to the Lahore
High Court.  The Government also refused to confirm six judges
named to the High Court in Sindh province, and several High
Court judges in Punjab, who had been appointed when the
opposition party was in power.

After dissolving the first Bhutto government in 1990, President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan established special "accountability"
tribunals to try members of previous federal and provincial
governments on criminal and corruption charges.  However, only
members of the Bhutto government--all of whom belong to the
PPP--were charged with corruption and misconduct.  No members
of other political parties were brought to trial.  In 1994 the
tribunals acquitted the accused.

In 1994 the Government brought numerous criminal cases against
members of the former Nawaz Sharif government, their
businesses, and their political supporters.  The Government
also filed cases to have Nawaz Sharif and other members of his
party disqualified from the National Assembly.  The Government
incarcerated several accused persons, including Nawaz Sharif's
75-year-old father, who was arrested in November for tax
evasion and money laundering.  The authorities released the
father after 4 days, but at year's end his case and those of
the others were pending.

A 1990 Shari'a court decision resulted in the introduction of
the Islamic concepts of Qisas--roughly an "eye for an eye"--and
Diyat--"blood money"--into the Penal Code.  The Qisas and Diyat
Ordinance allows compensation to be paid to a victim's family
in lieu of the accused receiving punishment.  As a result,
wealthy or influential persons sometimes escape punishment for
such crimes as murder and assault.  The right to seek pardon or
commutation is not available to defendants under the
ordinance.  The Hadood and Qisas and Diyat ordinances apply to
both ordinary criminal courts and Shari'a courts.

Appeals of certain Hadood convictions involving penalties in
excess of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the
Shari'a courts.  Cases referred to the Federal Shari'a court
are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges
using ordinary criminal procedures.  Cases referred to the
Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court are heard jointly by Islamic
scholars and Supreme Court judges using ordinary criminal
procedures.  Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and be
familiar with Islamic law.  Within these limits, defendants in
the Shari'a court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice.
There is a system of bail.

Under the Hadood Ordinances, evidence is given different weight
depending on the religion and sex of the witness.  A non-Muslim
may not be a witness against a Muslim but may offer testimony
against another non-Muslim.  Testimony of females is not
admissible for the harsher punishments (lashing, amputation,
and stoning).  In cases involving financial matters, the
testimony of two women is required for it to be admitted as
evidence.  The evidentiary laws that apply to lesser
punishments are roughly based on English common law.

There continued to be charges that magistrates and police,
under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade
detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the
consequences.  Politically powerful persons also attempt to
influence magistrates' decisions and have used various forms of
pressure on the magistrates, including the threat to transfer
them to other assignments.  Magistrates also perform a wide
variety of administrative functions for the provincial
governments, reducing the time devoted to judicial duties.

Administration of justice in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas is normally the responsibility of tribal elders and
maliks, or leaders.  They may conduct hearings according to
Islamic law and tribal custom.  In such proceedings, the
accused have no right to legal representation, bail, or
appeal.  The usual penalties consist of fines, even for
murder.  However, the Government's political agents, who are
federal civil servants assigned to local governments, oversee
such proceedings and may impose prison terms of up to 14 years.

In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of the Political
Agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or
stoning.  Paramilitary forces under the direction of the
political agents frequently perform punitive actions during
enforcement operations.  For example, in raids on criminal
activities the authorities have been known to damage
surrounding homes as extrajudicial punishment of residents for
having tolerated nearby criminal activity.

There are fewer than 10 known political prisoners.  Several are
serving sentences under the laws concerning the Ahmadi
religious sect.  One person is appealing the death sentence for
blasphemy (see Section 2.c.).

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
         Correspondence

By law the police must obtain a warrant to search a house but
do not need a warrant to search a person.  However, the police
often enter homes without a warrant.  In the absence of a
warrant, a policeman is subject to charges of criminal
trespass.  However, policemen are seldom punished for illegal
entry.

The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services
which monitor politicians, political activists, suspected
terrorists, and suspected foreign intelligence agents.
Credible reports indicate that the authorities commonly resort
to wiretapping and occasionally intercept and open mail.